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I n	§9	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	Kant	raises	a	question	that	he	flags	as	the	“key	to	the	critique	of	taste”.	He	has	already	argued	that	a	judgment	of	beauty	has	an	essential	relation	to	the	feeling	of	plea-














“universal	 validity”:	 it	 claims,	 that	 is,	 that	 it	 is	 correct	 to	—	or,	 equiva-
lently,	that	everyone	ought to	—	find	the	judged	object	beautiful.	This	is	
possible,	Kant	argues,	only	if	the	pleasure	is	a	consequence	of	judging.


















1 Accounts of §9
1.1 Guyer’s Two-Act View (J1→F → J2)
In	Kant and the Claims of Taste,	Paul	Guyer	attempts	to	solve	the	puzzle	
of	§9	by	claiming	 that	 the	 judgment	of	beauty	 involves	 two	distinct	












act	of	 judging	 (J1→F);	 this	pleasure	 then	serves	as	 the	object	of	 the	
judgment	of	beauty	proper	that	claims	its	universal	validity	(F→J2).










The	 judgment	 ‘X	 is	beautiful’,	according	 to	Kant,	 is	essentially	differ-




























we	 are	 entitled	 to	 claim	 universal	 validity	 for	 judgments	 of	 beauty	
because	they	are	grounded	in	a	state	that	is	a	necessary	condition	of	
judgment	 in	 general.	 Interpreters	 have	 worried	 that	 this	 attempted	
deduction	has	the	consequence	that	all	 judgments	must	 involve	the	
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what	goes	on	when	we	judge	an	object	to	be	beautiful”	(Ibid.,	34).	The	







It	must	 also	 be	 noted	 that	—	notwithstanding	 its	 ability	 to	 recon-
cile	 the	problematic	 theses	 in	§9	—	Ginsborg’s	view	bears	an	uneasy	






Finally,	 the	 austerity	 of	 Ginsborg’s	 account	 of	 the	 mental	 state	
that	grounds	the	judgment	of	beauty	 is	 in	tension	with	Kant’s	many	
5.	 These	particular	worries	do	not	arise	for	the	one-act	view	that	Rachel	Zuck-














that	 these	assertions	of	Kant’s	are	 “mischaracterizations	of	 the	structure	of	
aesthetic	judging”	(330).	On	my	view,	F→J	is	as	central	to	Kant’s	view	as	J→F;	























Ginsborg’s	 interpretation	 succeeds	 in	 reconciling	 the	 two	 theses	 in	










own	 words	—	an	 “unusual	 and	 initially	 counter-intuitive	 model	 of	
4.	 In	Ginsborg,	The Normativity of Nature,	32–52.
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In	 this	way,	 imagination	and	understanding	work	 together	 to	gener-
ate	an	objective	representation	that	has	both	intuitive	and	conceptual	
content.	In	the	case	of	beauty,	in	contrast,	the	relation	between	imagi-










descriptions	of	 it.	 For	 example,	Kant	describes	 this	 state	 in	§9	 itself	
as	one	of	 the	 “animation	of	both	 faculties	 (the	 imagination	and	 the	




and	 understanding),	 enlivened	 through	 mutual	 agreement”	 (5:219).	
Ginsborg	must	disregard	these	many	descriptions	of	the	mental	state	
that	Kant	claims	is	involved	in	making	a	judgment	of	beauty,	since,	on	
her	view,	 its	only	content	 is	 the	 reflexive	approval	 I	have	described	
above.6
6.	 Ginsborg	 recognizes	 this	 implication	of	her	view	and	accepts	 it:	according	
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Kant	 clearly	distinguishes	 the	 subject’s	awareness	of	 the	harmony	of	
her	faculties	from	the	pleasure	that	accompanies	this	awareness:
[A]n	 aesthetic	 judgment	 is	 that	 whose	 determining	
ground	lies	in	a	sensation	[Empfindung]	that	is	immediate-
ly connected with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure	 [mit 
dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust unmittelbar verbunden ist].	
…	In	the	aesthetic	 judgment	of	sense	[i.e.,	 judgments	of	
the	agreeable]	 it	 is	 that	sensation	which	 is	 immediately	
produced	by	the	empirical	intuition	of	the	object,	in	the	
aesthetic	judgment	of	reflection	[i.e.,	judgments	of	beau-
ty]	…	 it	 is	 that sensation which the harmonious play of the 
two faculties of cognition in the power of judgment, imagina-
tion and understanding, produces	in	the	subject	insofar	as	in	
the	given	representation	the	faculty	of	the	apprehension	
of	the	one	and	the	faculty	of	presentation	of	the	other	are	
reciprocally	 expeditious,	 which	 relation	 in	 such	 a	 case	
produces	through	this	mere	form	a sensation that is the de-





of the harmonious play	of	the	faculties	—	which	he	identifies	as	the	de-























[S]	Thus	 it	 is	 the	universal	 communicability	of	 the state 
of mind	in	the	given	representation	which,	as	the	subjec-
tive	condition	of	the	judgment	of	taste,	must	serve	as	its 
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…	 in	 what	 way	 do	 we	 become	 conscious	 of	 a	 mutual	
subjective	 correspondence	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 cognition	
with	each	other	 in	 the	 judgment	of	 taste	—	aesthetically,	







understanding)	 to	 an	 activity	 that	 is	 indeterminate	 but	
yet,	through	the	stimulus	of	the	given	representation,	in	
unison,	namely	that	which	belongs	to	a	cognition	in	gen-


















12.	 Guyer	 briefly	 considers	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 interpretation	 like	 mine,	 al-
though	without	noting	the	passages	I	cite	here	in	support	of	it	(Guyer,	Claims 
of Taste,	 90).	He	 immediately	 rules	 it	 out,	 however,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	
is	the	case	for	aesthetic	judgments	in general	—	both	judgments	of	the	



























as	we	have	seen,	Kant	 returns	 to	specifying	 the	structure	of	aesthetic	 judg-
ment	in	§9	of	the	body	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	and	his	comments	there	
seem	 to	 require	 and	 confirm	 the	 view	expressed	by	 these	passages	 in	 the	
First	Introduction.
11.	 See	also	A29	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	where	Kant	says	that	a	“pleasant	
taste”	[Wohlgeschmack]	is	grounded	in	“a	feeling	(of	pleasure	and	displeasure)	
as	an	effect	of	the	sensation	[of	taste]”.	




I	have	been	arguing	 that	 the	 feeling	of	harmony	and	 the	 feeling	
of	pleasure	are	distinct	feelings	for	Kant.	Distinguishing	them,	I	think,	
also	helps	to	clarify	another	aspect	of	 the	opening	paragraphs	of	§9.	






























Let	 me	 pause	 to	 clarify	 an	 important	 terminological	 point	 here.	
Kant	moves	between	referring	to	the	feeling	of	harmony	as	a	sensation 









rather	 than	of	 a	property	 that	 can	be	ascribed	 to	an	object.	Thus,	 a	
sensation	 of	 greenness,	 for	 example,	 counts	 as	 an	 “objective	 sensa-
tion”	since	it	affords	the	subject	awareness	of	a	property	she	ascribes	
to	 objects	 she	 cognizes	 as	 green;	 in	 contrast,	 the	 sensation	 of	 plea-































In	the	remainder	of	 this	section,	 I	work	out	 further	details	of	 the	
account	I	am	proposing	by	responding	to	a	number	of	potential	ques-
tions	 and	 objections.	 In	 §2.2,	 I	 relate	 the	 universal	 validity	 of	 the	
harmony	of	 the	 faculties	 to	 the	universal	 validity	of	pleasure	 in	 the	
beautiful.	In	§2.3,	I	respond	to	the	objection	that	my	view	is	ruled	out	
by	passages	in	which	Kant	identifies	consciousness	of	the	“subjective	





































the	 relation	 they	must	be	 in	 for	 judgment	 in	general	 to	be	possible	
(20:220;	see	also	20:211).	Bearing	this	in	mind,	I	argue	that,	for	Kant,	
judgments	 of	 beauty	 involve	 the	 following	 stages:	 When	 the	 sub-
ject	perceives	a	beautiful	object,	she	senses	the	harmonious	relation	
15.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 on	 the	 interpretations	 defended	 by	 Guyer,	 Ginsborg	 and	
Allison.	It	is	also	an	important	difference	between	my	account	and	the	one	
suggested	by	Béatrice	Longuenesse	in	“Kant’s	Leading	Thread”.	Longuenesse	
suggests	 that	 the	 pleasure	 in	 the	 beautiful	 is	 a	 “two-fold”	 pleasure:	 a	 first-
order	pleasure	in	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	combined	with	a	second-order	
pleasure	in	the	universal	validity	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	(207–9).	My	
account	 resembles	 Longuenesse’s	 insofar	 as	we	both	 identify	 two	 feelings	
in	the	beautiful.	A	crucial	difference,	however,	is	that,	according	to	me,	the	
feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	sui generis	feeling	that	is	not	itself	
pleasurable.	This	 is	 important,	 I	 think,	because	it	respects	Kant’s	 insistence	
in	§9	that	a	judgment	made	on	the	basis	of	pleasure	could	have	only	subjec-
tive	validity.	On	whether	Kant	allows	for	feelings	distinct	from	pleasure	and	
displeasure,	 see	§2.4	below.	That	 the	harmony	of	 the	 faculties	 is	not	 itself	
pleasurable	will	also	be	key	for	the	solution	to	the	problem	for	Kant’s	deduc-
tion	that	I	go	on	to	offer	in	§3.

















versally	 communicable	….	 Now,	 this	merely	 subjective	
(aesthetic)	judging	of	the	object,	or	of	the	representation	
through	which	the	object	is	given,	precedes the pleasure in 
it, and is the ground of this pleasure … but on that universal-
ity of the subjective conditions of the judging of objects alone is 
this universal subjective validity of satisfaction, which we com-
bine with the representation of the object that we call beautiful, 
grounded	(5:217–8,	my	emphases).
2.3 “Subjective Purposiveness” and Pleasure
I	also	need	to	address	what	may	seem	to	be	a	significant	textual	ob-
stacle	to	my	view:	the	fact	that	it	appears	inconsistent	with	passages	
in	 which	 Kant	 says	 alternatively	 that	 the	 “representation”	 (20:228,	
20:248),	the	“consciousness”	(5:222)	or	even	the	“concept”	(20:230)	of	











purposiveness”	of	 a	beautiful	object	with	 the	 feeling	of	pleasure.	 In	
§2.4,	 I	discuss	the	worry	that	Kant	does	not	make	room	for	any	feel-
ings	besides	pleasure	and	displeasure.	Finally,	 in	§2.5,	 I	make	 some	
comments	about	the	relation	between	the	feeling	of	harmony	and	the	
feeling	of	pleasure.






















feeling	of	harmony	and	at the same time	and	on that basis	establishes	the	
universal	validity	of	the	subject’s	pleasure	in	the	harmony.	This	is	just	
what	we	see	Kant	say	in	§9:











































(3)	⇒ HF = PL
To	begin	to	respond	to	the	objection,	 let	me	note	that	endorsing	(3)	










indicates	 that	he	 is	 indeed	committed	to	(6).	The	only	way	to	avoid	




To	 begin	 with,	 note	 that	 in	 the	 passages	 cited	 by	 the	 objection,	
“subjective	purposiveness”	is	primarily	ascribed	to	the	beautiful	object.	





	 janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful
philosophers’	imprint	 –		11		– vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019)
pleasure	and	displeasure.	For	one,	as	I	noted	above,	he	there	charac-























of	 feeling	discussed	above.	But	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	 it	 in-
volves	any	feelings	of	pleasure	or	displeasure;	indeed	this	would	be	very	
far	from	Kant’s	description	of	what	a	subject’s	awareness	of	herself	in	





24.	 See	Critique of Pure Reason,	A402,	B406–7,	B429–30.

















The	 consciousness	 of	 the	 causality	 of	 a	 representation	
with	respect	to	the	state	of	the	subject,	for	maintaining	it	
in	that	state,	can	here	designate	in	general	what	is	called	
pleasure;	 in	 contrast	 to	which	 displeasure	 is	 that	 repre-
sentation	 that	 contains	 the	 ground	 for	 determining	 the	
state	 of	 the	 representations	 to	 their	 own	 opposite	 (hin-
dering	or	getting	rid	of	them) (5:220).
To	claim	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	the	only	possible	feelings,	




her	 to	 change	 the	 representational	 state	 she	 is	 in	 (i.e.,	 displeasure).	
But	 does	 Kant	 really	 think	 that	 this	 is	 the	 only	 possible	 subjective	
state	one	can	be	aware	of?	There	 is	evidence	 that	at	 least	as	 late	as	
the	Prolegomena,	 Kant	 is	willing	 to	 countenance	 feelings	 other	 than	
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2.5 The Relation Between the Feeling of Harmony and Pleasure
Another	question	that	may	arise	for	my	proposal	is	the	nature	of	the	
relation	between	the	two	feelings	I	have	argued	it	is	necessary	to	dis-























harmony	of	 the	 faculties;	making	a	 judgment	of	beauty,	on	his	account,	 in-
volves	determining	whether	one’s	pleasure	in	fact	has	this	causal	origin	(Guy-
er,	Claims of Taste,	94–7;	134,	147).	Most	other	commentators,	including	Aquila	









How,	 then,	 should	we	understand	Kant’s	 claim	 in	 the	 First	 Intro-
duction	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	the	only	sensations	that	can	
















As	 I	 understand	 it,	 then,	 we	 need	 not	 read	 Kant	 as	 claiming	 at	
20:224	 that	 pleasure	 and	 displeasure	 are	 the	 only	 subjective	 sensa-
tions	tout court,	but	rather	that	they	are	the	only	sensations	that	play	
the	 role	of	 “subjective	predicates”	 in	aesthetic	 judgments.	 In	 fact,	 in	
the	very	sentence	preceding,	he	characterizes	aesthetic	judgments	in	
general	as	judgments	“whose	predicate	can	never	be	cognition”,	going	




25.	 See	Critique of Pure Reason,	B132–6.
26.	20:224;	5:191;	5:288;	5:289.






3 The Deduction of Judgments of Beauty
A	virtue	of	my	view	 is	 that	 it	 can	also	help	 to	 resolve	another	 long-
standing	 problem	 for	 Kant’s	 account	 of	 judgments	 of	 beauty.	 That	
problem	has	to	do	with	Kant’s	“Deduction”	of	judgments	of	beauty,	in	
which	Kant	 attempts	 to	 answer	 the	question	of	what	 entitles	 a	 sub-
ject	who	judges	an	object	 to	be	beautiful	 to	claim	that	others	ought	
















1.	 The	 pleasure	 in	 the	 beautiful	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 har-
mony	of	the	faculties.
31.	 That	 is,	as	 long	as	she	does	not	allow	the	sensory	pleasantness	and/or	the	












also	5:291).	 I	have	argued,	however,	 that	 this	sensation	is	not	 identi-
cal	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure;	rather,	as	Kant	goes	on	to	say,	pleasure	
is	combined	with	it.	On	my	view,	then,	it	is	the	 feeling of harmony	that	
undeniably	has	intentional	content:	 through	it,	 the	subject	becomes	
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Now,	 an	 important	 assumption	 that	 underlies	 the	 dilemma	 and	

















In	 this	 case,	 however,	 the	 entailment	 can	 be	 blocked	 by	 appeal-
ing	to	secondary	features	that	distinguish	the	aesthetic	case	from	the	
cognitive	one.	Though	both	involve	the	same	harmonious	relation	be-
tween	 the	cognitive	 faculties,33	 this	 relation	comes	about	differently	










and	 the	 feeling	of	pleasure.	On	such	a	view,	 there	 is	no	need	 to	differenti-
ate	aesthetic	from	cognitive	harmony	in	order	to	avoid	the	first	horn	of	the	
supposed	dilemma	posed	by	the	deduction.	Instead,	we	can	preserve	Kant’s	








Kant’s	 general	 strategy	 in	 the	 deduction	 of	 judgments	 of	 beauty,	
then	—	as	 in	his	 other	 deductions	—	is	 transcendental.	His	 argument	





pleasure	 in	 in	a	 judgment	of	beauty	 is	one	 that	any	 judging	subject	
must	be	able	to	share.	If	her	state	is	genuinely	determined	merely	by	








the	 form	of	 the	 following	dilemma:	Either	 the	harmony	of	 the	 facul-
ties	is	a	necessary	condition	of	judgment	in	general,	or	it	is	not.	If	it	is,	
and	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	 identical	to	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	
then	 every	 judgment	—	not	merely	 judgments	 of	 beauty	—	should	be	
pleasurable.	But	this	is	absurd.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	harmony	of	
the	 faculties	 is	not	 a	 condition	on	 judgment	 in	 general,	 then	Kant’s	
argument	 fails	 to	provide	the	necessary	entitlement	 for	 the	claim	of	
universal	validity	made	by	a	judgment	of	beauty.32
32.	 For	a	helpful	discussion	of	various	attempts	to	respond	to	the	dilemma,	see	
Rind,	 “Can	Kant’s	Deduction	 Be	 Saved?”	 Rind	 concludes	 that	 none	 of	 the	























ments	 of	 beauty	 on	which	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 beautiful	 involves	
two	separate	feelings:	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	and	
the	 feeling	 of	 pleasure.	 Distinguishing	 these	 two	 feelings,	 I	 argued,	









in	 the	 two	 cases.	 First,	 as	 I	 have	 already	discussed,	 the	harmony	 in	
the	case	of	beauty	comes	about	freely:	the	activity	of	the	imagination	
is	not	 governed	by	 a	 concept	of	 the	understanding.	 Second,	 and	of	
a	piece	with	this,	the	faculties	in	the	case	of	beauty	are	said	to	be	in	
play:	their	agreement	is	brought	about	not	by	the	subject’s	intentional	


























accordance	with	 the	 lawfulness	of	 the	understanding,	even	 though	 the	un-
derstanding	does	not	succeed	in	bringing	the	beautiful	object	under	a	con-
cept.	But	responding	to	these	questions	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.
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